Natural gas vs carbon: How LNG trade could impact carbon prices for the EU and its trade partners, including the Middle East
By Mariana Santos Moreira, Thought Leadership Director, Chemical Market Analytics by OPIS, and Humberto J. Rocha – Editor, Carbon Markets and Biodiversity, OPIS
EU industries have been paying a market-based carbon price since 2005. The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) requires industrial operators to surrender one carbon allowance (EUA) to domestic authorities for every metric ton of carbon they emit. This system covers around 10,000 installations across different industries, including oil refineries, steel works, iron production, aluminium, metals, cement, acids, bulk organic chemicals, lime, glass, and more, as well as the power generation sector. Additionally, by creating the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), the EU will apply its carbon price to imports.
Carbon prices and EUAs are a significant cost component for many European operators, and they are projected to rise as the number of allowances auctioned every year falls by more than 4% per annum and free allowances are gradually phased out. What many may not be aware of is how closely linked EUAs are to natural gas prices. Oil and gas market fluctuations can significantly affect European producers’ carbon costs, and with the CBAM, this will soon impact exporters into this region as well.
The EU ETS and CBAM go hand-in-hand
The domestic authorities of countries subject to the EU ETS distribute free EUAs annually to industrial operators in “hard-to-abate” economic sectors such as chemicals, steel, cement, and others to help cover their carbon emission costs. The free allowances are an incentive to remain within the EU rather than relocate to regions without carbon levies (carbon leakage).
Notably, if producers cut their emissions, they can sell surplus free allowances to other emitters, thereby profiting from decarbonizing their assets. The free allowances also mean that most EU chemical installations do not have to cover most of their emissions by buying EUAs.
That said, the EU free allowance phaseout will begin in 2026 and last eight years. This could land the affected sectors with a multibillion-euro carbon bill every year by 2034 if installations do not decarbonize their operations. Hefty carbon costs at a time when market conditions are already squeezing chemical producers’ margins will add to the challenge of navigating the cycle trough, which we expect to last well into the 2030s, and affect regional competitiveness.
By introducing the CBAM, the EU is attempting to phase out free allowances in a way that will avoid disadvantaging domestic operators exposed to foreign competitors. The CBAM-covered sectors currently include cement, steel, iron, aluminium, ammonia, hydrogen, and electricity.
The EU rolled out the CBAM’s transitional phase in October 2023. During this phase, EU importers do not have to pay for the embedded emissions of their imports but will file quarterly reports detailing emissions data. By 2027, the CBAM will require EU importers to pay the carbon price by purchasing CBAM certificates. Notably, EU importers must still retroactively pay for their 2026 import emissions.
The CBAM certificate price will be tethered to the quarterly average of EUA prices. This means the CBAM levy will follow EU carbon prices. OPIS forecasts that by the time free allowances are completely phased out and the CBAM is fully phased in—in 2034—the average EUA price will be €207.13.
The EU has just simplified the CBAM’s scope
In June 2025, the EU Parliament and the Council of the European Union agreed on changes to the CBAM. The provisional agreement requires endorsement by the council and the EU Parliament before final adoption, which is expected by September 2025. Chief among the revisions is changing the threshold that would trigger an EU importer’s compliance with the CBAM: it now applies only to shipments of 50 mt or more per importer over a 12-month period. For chemical commodities, this change is of little consequence due to the typical trading volumes for these products. Of greater importance is the upcoming revision in the second half of this year to the planned scope of the CBAM: The plan is to cover all EU ETS sectors, including organic chemicals and polymers, by 2030 – but these could be included earlier.
CBAM benchmarking: How the Middle East can gain ground in the EU chemical market
The CBAM will allocate free allowances based on benchmarks per product. For 2021–25, there are 54 established benchmarks (plaster, roof tiles, coke, hot metal, soda ash, hydrogen, etc). Once the CBAM is rolled out to plastics and organic chemicals, benchmarks will be established for these products too. The benchmarks standardize emissions per ton of product made, based on the top 10% most efficient installations producing said product that are now covered by the EU ETS (notably, benchmarks will be updated for 2026–30).
If EU importers are unable to provide actual data on embedded emissions, marked up default values will be used. In theory, the lower the benchmark and the higher the embedded emissions intensity, the larger the CBAM cost. This means that producers in other regions that report lower embedded emissions relative to the established benchmark can have a competitive advantage when exporting to the EU.
Gas-based GCC assets with a lower carbon footprint could be in a good position to export more product to the EU once CBAM kicks in. The GCC chemical exports strategy has been largely focusing on growing volumes to emerging markets in Asia, especially India, and Africa. While we expect this focus to remain, Europe will still be an interesting strategic market to retain (taking advantage of competitive lower emission petrochemical assets) and even grow (e.g. renewables-based products like ammonia, fertilizers, methanol, hydrogen).
Carbon price forecasting and natural gas: the hidden connection
The OPIS Carbon Suite provides historical EUA pricing and forecasting to 2039. This is also important for exporters to the EU, as the EUA price will figure in the CBAM levy calculations once these kick in. Interestingly, historical data clearly shows a strong correlation between EUAs and natural gas prices (TTF). When the relative price of natural gas rises compared to coal, utilities often shift to coal-fired generation. Higher emissions from fuel switching in turn increase EUA demand and support prices.
The main exemption to this correlation was seen during peak US tariff announcements, where expectations of a macroeconomic slowdown and reduced industrial activity would potentially lower emissions, reducing demand for EUAs.
Strait of tension: How Middle East geopolitics are redrawing global energy security
Given the significance of oil and gas product trade in the Middle East, any conflict or disruption, particularly involving the Strait of Hormuz, would severely impact global access to these commodities, directly impacting European and Asian supplies.
As Israel–Iran tensions rise, markets are particularly concerned that Iran could threaten the Strait of Hormuz, which major crude exporters such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) use to ship to global markets.
There is no comparable historical precedent to a full interruption of Hormuz flows. The most recent sudden loss of supply was in 2022, when the US and Europe implemented financial and economic sanctions on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine. At that time, Russia exported approximately 4.2Mbbl/d of crude oil, which could not immediately trade. Potential crude trade disruption in the Strait of Hormuz would impact at least four times as much volume as the interruption of Russian crude traded in 2022: 15–20Mbbl/day of crude oil pass through this vital chokepoint, some 25–26% of the global crude trade, as well as 4Mbbl/d of refined products, about 4% of the global refined products trade.
The Middle East also plays a vital role in LNG trade. Although Iran itself has limited exposure in the LNG trade, all LNG shipments from Qatar, the UAE, and Oman must transit through the Strait of Hormuz. There is no viable alternative route. Roughly 23% of global LNG supply last year, nearly 95Mmt, passed through the strait. So far in 2025, LNG exports from Qatar, Oman and the UAE accounted for more than 30% of Asia’s imports and nearly 10% of Europe’s.
These vulnerabilities are emerging at a time of structural tightness in Europe, whose reliance on LNG imports grew since Russian gas flows via Ukraine were cut. Any meaningful disruption to Qatari volumes would leave another significant supply gap. Although new US liquefaction capacity is ramping up, there is insufficient near-term elasticity to fully cover the combined shortfall of the lost Ukraine transit and potential Middle Eastern disruption.
The unexpected carbon implications of gas prices volatility
For European chemical producers, the impact of higher oil and gas prices would be threefold. First, higher oil prices would increase inflationary pressures and hinder global economic growth. The EU chemical industry is already struggling with weak demand, which would worsen further. Second, higher energy costs would impact chemical feedstock and utilities costs. As the EU chemical sector is already struggling to maintain its competitiveness, even more capacity could be rationalized if the situation persists.
Third, and most unexpected, is the historical contribution of higher gas prices to increased carbon costs. Notably, persistent low economic growth and subdued industrial output would likely cap EUA demand growth in the near term. Even without a formal recession, heightened uncertainty and weak investment activity should put downward pressure on EUA prices. However, if the correlation with natural gas persists, carbon prices in the EU could increase in the event of severe oil and gas trade disruptions and gas price spikes.
In such a scenario, European plants with higher emissions than the free allowances allocated to them would have to either rein in operating rates or spend more to purchase enough EUAs to make up for the difference in reported emissions against free allowances. Hence, this would further increase running costs for EU operators and further negatively impact their global competitiveness, potentially opening the market to more imports.
GCC influence on the EU: CBAM link to global LNG markets
Looking ahead, the EUA link to natural gas prices is expected to persist within the EU. For GCC chemical producers that export to the EU, EUA prices will be important once CBAM kicks in for these products – likely within this decade – as the EU carbon costs directly weigh into the CBAM calculation. As such, understanding EUA price drivers will become crucial to those doing business with the EU.
The CBAM phase-in timeline goes beyond the present geopolitical tensions and potential short-term disruption in oil and gas markets. However, natural gas demand is projected to increase globally in the long term because it is seen as a transition fuel as the world decarbonizes. As the appetite for natural gas grows and this market continues to globalize, more levers will be at play when it comes to gas supply/demand and price, potentially contributing to market volatility.
Additionally, the EU carbon price link to natural gas means that the more LNG supply is available to Europe, the more likely it is that EUAs – and therefore CBAM costs to exporters to the EU – stay more stable and at a lower level. In that sense, the GCC’s global LNG market share is significant enough that it can affect global availability and influence CBAM costs across EU trade partners.
Ultimately, GCC chemical producers eyeing the EU as a trade destination must track both EU carbon regulations progress and gas markets closely, to ensure they apply the right export strategy at the right time.














